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With unexpected speed, the International Criminal Court has become a
reality. Now that the ICC prosecutor and judges are sitting in The Hague, a
careful analysis of the Court's implications for the future of legal accountability
for international crimes has become all the more important. At the entry into
force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on July 1, 2002,
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan gave his evaluation--claiming that the court
would be "a great victory for justice, and for world order-a turn away from the
rule of brute force, and towards the rule of law."'
He was both right and wrong-right that we have witnessed a significant
turn toward the rule of law, but wrong that the court itself will be a powerful
and direct means for justice and world order. I do not mean to say that the ICC
is not important. In fact, it is extremely important. Rather, I hope to sketch for
you today the outlines of a court that, created in compromise, is highly
constrained, but has great potential to transform international criminal justice
as we understand it today.
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Secretary General Kofi Annan, Statement at the Closing of the 9th Session of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, Apr. 19, 2002, available at http://www.iccnow.org/
resourcestools/statements/unbodies/KofiAnnanPlenaryl9April02.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
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I will begin by suggesting four reasons why the ICC as it has been created
is an extremely limited mechanism and will not itself be the victory for justice
the Secretary-General predicted. Then, I will offer three observations about how
the ICC will nonetheless transform and greatly strengthen accountability for
international crimes. I will conclude with a brief look toward the future.
I. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ICC
There is probably no weaker court in the world-including the local traffic
court down the street-than the International Criminal Court. The ICC was
designed to be weak. Its architects feared the effects of a powerful court and
throughout the process of drafting the Rome Statute they reached a number of
compromises that effectively undercut the Court at every turn. Most of these
compromises were pushed by the U.S. delegation at Rome. U.S. Ambassador
David Scheffer knew the only hope for U.S. ratification was a court so constrained it would appear impotent to its domestic critics. The Europeans gave
way-in part to placate the U.S. and in part because they too could come to fear
a strong court. I will hope to explore the limitations of the court by examining
four of these compromises-the limitations on jurisdiction, the narrow
admissibility of cases, the lack of authority to apprehend, and the Court's
limited capacity.
A.

Limited Jurisdiction

One of the major compromises reached at Rome was to restrict the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Largely based on pressure from
the U.S., the Rome Statute requires that either the state where the crimes
occurred or the state of which the accused is a national be a party to the Statute.
This compromise, embodied in Article 12 of the Statute, has profound
implications. In short it means that only crimes committed on the territory of a
state party to the Statute or those committed by a national of a state party to the
Statute can be prosecuted by the Court. Yet, this also effectively defines the two
types of states least likely to accept the jurisdiction of the court. States where
international crimes occur are often experiencing massive governmental breakdown or are run by tyrants who commit international crimes. These are the very
people who wish to avoid prosecution and are unlikely to join the Court. Compounding this limitation, in cases where a dictator commits crimes against his
own people, the national and territorial states are likely to be the same. Governments that are likely to commit crimes themselves are unlikely to join the Court
and subject their own nationals to prosecution. Thus, the Court is unlikely to
have jurisdiction over the very countries where crimes are most likely to be
committed and where national courts are most likely to be ineffective. From the
perspective of accountability, this is far from an ideal outcome.
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Notably lacking in the Court's jurisdiction are the victim state and the
custodial state. Including the victim state - the state whose nationals were the
victim of the crime-in the Court's jurisdiction would have promoted accountability by focusing on those who were most effected by the crimes. Similarly,
giving the Court jurisdiction when the custodial state-the state in which the
accused is found-was a party would also have expanded the ICC's reach,
allowing it to prosecute when a suspect is apprehended by some third state.
Without these jurisdictional provisions, the ICC will have a hard time finding
cases in which it is empowered to prosecute.
Admittedly, the picture is not entirely bleak. Already more than 80 states
have ratified the Statute. This includes a number of surprising candidatesstates in which it is entirely possible that international crimes could be
committed. Moreover, it seems that many transitional governments have
decided to accept the Court's jurisdiction, in part to lock in future governments,
subjecting them to the ICC and thereby hopefully preventing them from
committing crimes in the future. Over time more states are sure to join, thus
further expanding the Court's reach. However, at least in the short term, the ICC
will find these limitations on jurisdiction a significant bar to ending impunity.
B. Complementarity and the limits of admissibility
A second major restriction on the ICC, which renders it a weak institution,
is the limit on admissibility of cases before the Court. In another compromise
at Rome, Article 17 of the Statute dictates that the cases are only admissible
where national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. This is the principle
of complementarity, which gives national courts a first opportunity to prosecute
before the ICC can act. Understanding complementarity is essential to understanding the ICC. In effect, the ICC is designed to be a backstop to national
courts, rather than itself on the front lines of prosecution. In fact, all a national
court has to do to block the ICC from prosecuting is to conduct a good faith
investigation and determine that no crime was committed. Where a national
court investigates or prosecutes in good faith, the ICC is rendered powerless.
Note that this is very different from the Yugoslav (ICTY) or Rwandan
(ICTR) Tribunals, which have primacy over national courts. The ICTY can take
a case away from a national court if it wants to, but that the ICC must defer to
national courts. Again, the constraining implications of complementarity are
profound. Even if an individual is within the ICCs jurisdiction and the
prosecutor wants to pursue the case, if a national court-any national courtinvestigates or prosecutes, the ICC is effectively stopped in its tracks. Thus,
despite the Court's best efforts to act, any national court can prevent it from
doing so.
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It is yet unclear what will constitute sufficient investigation by a national
court to render the case inadmissible before the ICC. An important aspect of the
Rome Statute is that it gives the ICC self-judging power in this respect through
pre-trail motions. The ICC will itself determine when national court efforts are
insufficient and therefore cases are admissible to the ICC. On one end of the
spectrum, it could determine that only serious, legitimate prosecutions by
national courts are sufficient to deny the ICC the power to prosecute. Conceivably, however, investigation could be defined more broadly to even include
investigations by a truth and reconciliation commission that-notwithstanding
its impact on reconciliation-does little to combat impunity. One of the most
interesting questions the ICC will address in its early cases, then, is what
constitutes sufficient investigation by a national court and when such prosecution is legitimate. To some degree, this will be a political question, with the
Assembly of States Parties exerting pressure on the Court to either expand or
restrict admissibility. However the ICC rules on these issues in its early cases,
the Rome Statute makes clear that limits on admissibility will deprive the ICC
of any number of cases.
C. The Difficulty of Apprehension
The third limit facing the ICC is the difficulty of apprehending suspects.
Indicted war criminals don't generally hand themselves over to courts. They are
often in hiding or in places beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities.
Despite requirements for national cooperation in the apprehension of suspects,
the ICC has no police or military force at its disposal to secure the arrest of
indictees. The Yugoslav Tribunal has also suffered from this problem. It was
only able to secure its first suspect - Dusko Tadic - by exercising its powers
of primacy, a power the ICC notably lacks, and having the German authorities
hand over Dusko Tadic who was sitting in a German prison. The ICTY has
another significant advantage over the ICC in apprehension. Most ICTY
indictees are in Bosnia or Kosovo, areas patrolled by KFOR and SFOR,
multinational forces that have the power to arrest. Nonetheless, two of the
ICTY's most wanted suspects, Radavan Karadic and Ratko Mladic, remain at
large. Most of the ICC's indictees, in contrast, will be in territories without such
multinational forces. Moreover, many of the likely target states for investigations have very limited national police forces to arrest suspects themselves or
may be undergoing political transition and unwilling to apprehend suspects
because of the potential for political destabalization.
The ICC's power of apprehension is ever further limited by the U.S.
hostility to the Court. Take, for example, the ICC's first likely case - the crimes
in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN Mission in
Congo (MONUC) currently lacks the authority and probably also the military
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capacity to arrest potential indictees. If a Chapter VII Resolution were put
forward in the Security Council to give MONUC such authority, it seems likely
the U.S. would oppose the move and exercise its veto. In other regions such as
Iraq, peacekeeping forces are largely led by the U.S. Again given U.S.
opposition to the Court, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. military would
arrest an indictee and hand him over to the ICC.
Even after the ICC finds a case over which it has jurisdiction and which is
admissible, the challenge of apprehension will remain. Just as the first ICTY
prosecutor, South African Justice Richard Goldstone, carefully chose his first
cases to focus on low-level perpetrators who could be apprehended, so too will
Louis Moreno-Ocampo, the new ICC prosecutor, have to chose suspects who
can be apprehended. Likely scenarios for early arrests include cases where the
government of the territorial state is able and willing to hand over indictees or
where such indictees travel to other states that will arrest them. This is, in fact,
how Tihomir Blaskic, a Serb general, was arrested when he when to a
conference in Vienna. Again, these limits on the power of the ICC to apprehend
suspects will undoubtedly shape and restrict the Court's effectiveness.
D. Limited Capacity
The fourth constraint on the ICC is its limited capacity. The ICC is
designed to be a small court. At most, it may handle a few trials a year.
International justice is, after all, slow and expensive. In its nearly 10 years of
existence, the ICTY has issued just over 20 decisions and sentenced only about
30 individuals. The trial of Slobadon Milosevic is already well into its second
year. It seems highly unlikely that the ICC could operate more quickly or handle
many more cases than has the ICTY. By guaranteeing extensive procedural
protections, the Rome Statute has ensured the ICC will hear only a few cases.
Yet, each year hundreds, if not thousands, of international crimes are committed
around the globe. In its first year of operation the ICC received 499 communications from individuals in 66 countries suggesting possible crimes to investigate
and prosecute. The ICC simply lacks the capacity to deal with all, or even a
significant proportion, of these alleged crimes. It will have to choose its cases
carefully. Consequently, many crimes will go unprosecuted.
II. THE ICC AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
I have just sketched a picture of a weak and circumscribed court. The ICC
can only exercise jurisdiction in very few cases. Cases are only admissible
before the ICC when all national courts are unable or unwilling to act. The ICC
will have a very hard time apprehending suspects even when it has jurisdiction.
And it will only be able to hear a few cases. This is not a court that the U.S.
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should fear or need actively thwart. In fact, it is a court that is likely to have
little direct impact in its early years.
While the ICC is, by intent and compromise, a weak court, it is also a court
with extraordinary potential to transform international criminal law and advance
accountability everywhere. Let me share with you three ways in which I
anticipate the ICC will reshape the landscape of international criminal law in at
least the following three ways.
A. An Expansion of Crimes
First, let us consider the case of Ituri in Eastern Congo, where two of the
most heinous international crimes are occurring with systematic regularity. In
Ituri mass rape is being used as a political tool. There are no accurate reports as
to the number of victims. But thousands, if not tens of thousands of women and
men have been the victims of mass sexual violence. Similarly, in this region of
Congo tens of thousands of children under the age of 15 are being conscripted
-kidnapped might be a better word-and forced to serve regional warlords.
Even if the children are able to escape, they are rarely welcomed back into their
communities for fear that they have become spies and will betray the village.
Often they are malnourished, drug addicted and toting AK 47s. The look in their
eyes is both heartbreaking and frightening. Before the Rome Statute the
perpetrators of sexual violence and crimes against children in internal armed
conflicts would probably have gone unpunished.
In fact, before the Rome Statute it is unclear whether their acts would have
been subject to individual criminal responsibility at all. Generally, international
humanitarian law has two separate regimes-one for international conflicts and
for internal conflicts. War crimes committed in international armed conflictswhere two states go to war with one another-are regulated by the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. The ICC definition of war crimes in international armed
conflicts moves beyond the Geneva Conventions by including sexual crimes and
the conscription of child soldiers. For example, Article 8(2)(b) of the Statute
includes the commission of rape, sexual slavery and the conscription of children
under the age of 15 as war crimes.
Traditionally, war crimes committed in internal conflicts--civil wars and
the likes-have been subject to less regulation and civilian victims have had
even less protection. The Rome Statute, however, includes a long list of crimes
in internal armed conflicts that are subject to the Court's jurisdiction. For
example, the Statute, in its definition of war crimes in internal armed conflicts,
includes intentional attacks on civilians, rape, and the conscription of minors.
In many ways this is a radical and very important expansion of international
criminal law and has been described by some commentators as the greatest
achievement of the Rome Conference. Today, the crimes against women and
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children in Eastern Congo are for the first time unquestionably subject to
individual responsibility. Moreover, as states enact the requisite domestic
legislation to implement the Rome Statute, they are modifying their own penal
codes to include wider definitions of war crimes, including those committed in
internal armed conflicts.
A little-noted paragraph in the preamble of the Rome Statute may also have
a significant effect in expanding the substance of international criminal law. The
paragraph provides, in a relatively understated tone "that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes." Prior to the Rome Statute, states were authorized to prosecute international crimes. However, with the exception of Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, they were under no obligation to do so. Yet, the preamble to the
Rome Statute speaks of a duty for states parties to affirmatively exercise jurisdiction. That paragraph should expand the willingness and ability of national
courts to prosecute international crimes. Taken to its logical conclusion, the
failure of states to enact the necessary domestic legislation and actually prosecute such crimes could generate some level of state responsibility. If said
paragraph were operationalized, it would imply an affirmative duty for states to
actively prosecute international crimes. Time will tell whether states parties take
that duty seriously.
B. Empowering National Courts
While it is true that according to the pinciple of complementarity discussed
earlier, the ICC is constrained to act only when national courts fail to do so, at
the same time the principle of complementarity is probably the most important
and transformative aspect of the Statute. Rather than thinking of complementarity as a limit on the ICC, we can also view it as a way of empowering
national courts. Complementarity fundamentally changes the incentives for
national courts and should make them more likely to address international
crimes directly. Before the ICC, national courts had the choice of either prosecuting international crimes or allowing impunity. For a variety of political
reasons, such courts often chose--or were forced to choose-impunity. With
the creation of the ICC, however, the choice is very different. National courts
can either prosecute the crimes themselves--ensuring some level of control over
the proceedings and possibly greater acceptance by the local population -- or the
ICC may step in and prosecute. Many national courts would rather maintain
control over the prosecution themselves. With these choices, national courts
should be far more likely to act themselves and motivated, to clean up their own
messes at home in order to avoid ICC action.
National courts are extremely powerful tools. To the degree that the ICC
can spur them into action that is a great advancement for accountability. First,
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national courts are ubiquitous. Collectively, their jurisdiction covers just about
every territory where a crime could occur. Second, they are proximate to crimes
and victims. This facilitates the collection of evidence and the involvement of
victims. Finally, national courts have police power at their disposal and they can
use that power to apprehend and arrest suspects.
The new prosecutor of the ICC, Louis-Moreno Ocampo, understands this
fundamental power of the Court to encourage national courts to act. As he
observed at his swearing in this past July: "the absence of trials before this
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions,
would be a major success." 2
The ICC is having its desired effect in empowering national courts. Let me
give you an example. The ICC Prosecutor has recently indicated that his first
investigation is likely to involve the crimes in the Ituri region of Congo. The
war in the Congo over the past decade has caused somewhere on the order of
five million deaths, with at least tens of thousands dead since the entry into
force of the Rome Statute last year. Yet, there is a new transitional government
in Congo and, for the first time in years, there are real prospects for peace.
While the ICC should and will have some role to play in ensuring accountability
in Congo, after the Prosecutor's announcement that Congo will be the Court's
first investigation, the government of Congo has shown new interest in
strengthening its failed national judiciary. I will be working closely with the
U.S. Department of State to investigate possibilities for developing national
judicial capabilities in Congo to deal with these crimes and will present a report
to the State Department and the ICC on how the domestic Congolese judiciary
and the ICC could work together to provide accountability in Congo as
envisioned by the concept of complemetnarity.
Many crimes committed in Congo are outside the jurisdiction of the ICC
as they were committed before July 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into
force. Even if the ICC does prosecute some of the crimes committed in Eastern
Congo, given the vast scale of crimes, there is no way it could prosecute all
those responsible. If, however, the threat of ICC prosecution spurs the Congolese government to create domestic prosecutorial mechanisms, it can foster the
development of national capacity and promote accountability on a larger scale.
Another way in which the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute
strengthen accountability is by encouraging the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by national courts. The principle of universality allows national courts to
prosecute international crimes wherever they are committed. A number of states
have passed the necessary domestic legislation to do so. For example, Belgium
2.
Louis Moreno-Ocampo, Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, June 16, 2003, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo
- english final.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
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and the Netherlands have prosecuted international criminals from Rwanda,
Congo, and Surinam. Complementarity gives national courts-even those outside the state where the crimes occurred-the opportunity to prosecute before
the ICC. Complementiary may make national courts more willing to exercise
universal jurisdiction.
Taken collectively, complementarity should greatly enhance accountability
for international crimes. It allows and encourages series of different courts to
prosecute international crimes. In so doing, it tends to keep prosecutions close
to home, promoting legitimacy and enhancing the reconciliatory effects of
criminal prosecution.
C. Backstopping National Courts
The third way in which the ICC may transform the future of accountability
is by acting as a backstop for national courts. I have already described the
potential power and benefit of national courts. Yet, sometimes national courts
will fail. There are countless reasons for such failures---domestic political pressure, lack of capacity, and corruption, just to name a few. A judge in Congo,
after noting that judges had not been paid in over five years, told me how to
differentiate between a good judge and a corrupt one. He explained the good
judge hears the case, decides who has the best argument and shakes down that
side for money, effectively his salary. The bad judge demands payments from
both parties and sides with the one who pays most. I'm not sure we want even
a good unpaid judge enforcing international criminal law.
Even where national courts are not corrupt, they may not be effective.
Take, for example, the courts of Chile that could not prosecute Augusto
Pinochet due do national amnesty and domestic political pressure. Or, the courts
of Rwanda which, for many years after the genocide, simply lacked the
resources to engage in meaningful prosecution. One judge in Rwanda complained to me in 1999 that his office lacked pencils and paper to record cases.
National courts should and will be on the front lines of international criminal
law, but there will be times when they are unable or unwilling to act.
In these cases the ICC will be able to play a direct and meaningful role in
prosecution. Admittedly, the ICC could not act in the two cases I have just
mentioned-the crimes of Pinochet or the Rwandan genocide-because they
occurred before the Rome Statute entered into force. But, looking toward the
future, as the jurisdiction of the ICC expands and when national courts fail to
prosecute, the ICC will find itself with a meaningful case load. In some of these
casers it will step in as a backstop and ensure accountability. Admittedly, some
cases will still slip through the cracks. Given the limits on jurisdiction, admissibility, and apprehension, there will be crimes that can not be prosecuted anywhere. But, over time, the ICC will continue to narrow the realm of impunity.
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The ICC will have at least one other important function as a backstop to
national courts. It will ensure some level of commonality and uniformity of
jurisprudence. In the international criminal system there is no general form of
appellate review. While individual cases can be reviewed within their own court
system, no overarching supreme court exists to ensure commonality of jurisprudence. With the growing number of national and supranational courts enforcing international law this could pose a threat to the system as different standards
evolve in different courts. Even though the ICC may handle only a few cases,
it seems likely that national courts will defer to its decisions on key points of
international criminal law. Just as the ICTY has played this role to date-with
national courts frequently referencing ICTY decisions-the ICC will come to
be the standard bearer of international criminal jurisprudence. Its comparatively
greater resources, its international status, and the expected quality of its staff
make it seem likely that the ICC-even acting only as a backstop-will come to
be the definitive voice on the rules of international criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In conclusion, let me speculate for a moment on the future of accountability and, particularly, how we can move toward a real system of international
criminal justice. As I have argued, the ICC is weak. It will try only a relatively
small number of individuals. Where national courts are strong, they have jurisdiction over crimes committed on their territory and by their nationals. Relying
on the principle of universal jurisdiction, many states have enacted the necessary legislation to prosecute international crimes committed anywhere. Crucially, national courts have the police power to actually apprehend and arrest
suspects. And now, with the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute,
national courts have a new incentive to act. By developing domestic capacity
and prosecuting, national courts address crimes close to home and avoid investigation by the ICC. Yet, where national courts are unable or unwilling to actthe ICC will be able to step in. Acting as a backstop, the ICC will help ensure
accountability where other courts fail.
For this system to work, the ICC and national courts will have to cooperate. There will be many cases when the ICC will have to rely on national
courts. And. there will be times-such as when new law is being developed or
where globally known despots are being prosecuted-that national courts may
want or need to defer to the ICC. For this relationship to work national courts
and the ICC will have to build trust, such that the ICC can count on national
courts and national courts will not fear ICC prosecution. Congolese judges, for
example, will have to cooperate with their international counterparts and
international judges will have to help train and assist domestic judges. Both
sides will need to further develop and refine the "unable or unwilling to prose-
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cute" language of the Rome Statute so that these two layers of judicial institutions can cooperate.
Most importantly, the ICC and national courts will need to understand that
they are part of a common mission-accountability for international crimesand that both bring different tools and capabilities to that effort. If they succeed,
the Rome Statute and the ICC can have a truly transformative impact on the
future of international legal accountability. And the perpetrators of the crimes
will face justice.

